LanCog Seminar 2015-16: Abstracts
Session 19
1 July 2016, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
LanCog Day: Argument Rodizio
Abstract:
1 July 2016, 15:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
LanCog Day: Argument Rodizio
Abstract:
- Consequence or no consequence argument? (Diogo Santos)
- Knowledge Is Not the Most General Factive Mental State. (Elia Zardini)
- Chamberlain's argument against Rawls. ( Catarina Tello; invited student)
- Um contraexemplo para a simetria. (Fernando Furtado)
- Blatti's Animal Ancestor's Argument. (Hugo Luzio; invited student)
- An argument against Mill's epistemic argument on freedom of speech. (Pedro Dinis)
- About the definition of games. (Pedro Celestino; invited student)
- A Bayesian Argument against Humean Scepticism. (Pedro Galvão)
- The Paradox of the Learner. (Ricardo Santos)
Session 18
27 May 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Spacetime Functionalism and Quantum Gravity
David Yates
University of Lisbon
Abstract: Quantum theories of gravity seem to suggest that reality is not fundamentally spatiotemporal. This gives rise to an apparent problem of empirical incoherence, as our ability to gather evidence for scientific theories depends on observables located in spacetime (the position of a pointer, or a readout on a screen). One recent attempt to address this problem is a form of spacetime functionalism, similar to that endorsed by David Chalmers as a way of resisting the idea that the Matrix is a sceptical scenario. In this talk I introduce the basic issues, and discuss the extent to which spacetime functionalism of this kind is compatible with scientific realism.
27 May 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Spacetime Functionalism and Quantum Gravity
David Yates
University of Lisbon
Abstract: Quantum theories of gravity seem to suggest that reality is not fundamentally spatiotemporal. This gives rise to an apparent problem of empirical incoherence, as our ability to gather evidence for scientific theories depends on observables located in spacetime (the position of a pointer, or a readout on a screen). One recent attempt to address this problem is a form of spacetime functionalism, similar to that endorsed by David Chalmers as a way of resisting the idea that the Matrix is a sceptical scenario. In this talk I introduce the basic issues, and discuss the extent to which spacetime functionalism of this kind is compatible with scientific realism.
Session 17
20 May 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Four Objections to Neurath's Truth Theory
Raimundo Henriques
University of Lisbon
Abstract: Neurath’s coherentism, I claim, is semantic and not epistemic. According to his theory, the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’ should be redefined as follows (for any sentence p):
‘p is true’ =df p belongs to, or can be deduced from, the Encyclopaedia of Unified Science.
‘p is false’ =df p was excluded from the Encyclopaedia of Unified Science.
My goal on this talk is to see how Neurath’s theory of truth deals with four objections:
(1) The Isolation Argument
(2) The Transcendence Objection
(3) The Alternative Systems Objection
(4) Coherentism implies Idealism
I’ll conclude that Neurath’s theory can answer all of these, but that (3) and, especially, (4) reveal some of its weaknesses.
20 May 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Four Objections to Neurath's Truth Theory
Raimundo Henriques
University of Lisbon
Abstract: Neurath’s coherentism, I claim, is semantic and not epistemic. According to his theory, the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’ should be redefined as follows (for any sentence p):
‘p is true’ =df p belongs to, or can be deduced from, the Encyclopaedia of Unified Science.
‘p is false’ =df p was excluded from the Encyclopaedia of Unified Science.
My goal on this talk is to see how Neurath’s theory of truth deals with four objections:
(1) The Isolation Argument
(2) The Transcendence Objection
(3) The Alternative Systems Objection
(4) Coherentism implies Idealism
I’ll conclude that Neurath’s theory can answer all of these, but that (3) and, especially, (4) reveal some of its weaknesses.
Session 16
6 May 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Reading Session: "The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief", by David Chalmers
6 May 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Reading Session: "The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief", by David Chalmers
Session 15
29 April 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Thorough Necessitism, Moderate Contingentism and Theory Equivalence
Bruno Jacinto
University of St Andrews
Abstract: Consider a language containing only the propositional connectives, modal and actuality operators, first- and higher-order quantifiers, and identity. What is the true and most comprehensive theory formulated in this language? What is, in this sense, the correct higher-order modal logic? Elsewhere I have defended the necessary being of higher-order entities, as well as a plenitudinous comprehension principle for higher-order modal logic. This leaves two main candidate higher-order modal theories available, namely, Williamson’s Thorough Necessitism (Williamson, 2013, chs. 5-7) and Plantinga’s Moderate Contingentism (Plantinga, 1976). Prima facie, Thorough Necessitism implies the necessary being of every possible individual and Moderate Contingentism implies the contradictory of this thesis. Thus, the theories appear to be jointly inconsistent. The main aim of this talk is to show that the equivalence between Thorough Necessitism and Moderate Contingentism is a consequence of the Synonymy Account. This is an account of theory equivalence that I have developed and defended in other work and according to which, roughly, two theories are equivalent just in case (i) they assert of the same propositions that they stand in the same entailment relations, and (ii) they are committed to the truth of the same propositions. The equivalence between Thorough Necessitism and Moderate Contingentism implies that these theories are jointly consistent after all, despite appearances to the contrary. The equivalence between the theories also implies the stronger claim that they require the same of the world in order to be true. In this sense, there is no need to decide between them, and the dispute between their proponents is merely verbal. It will also be shown how sense can be made of the equivalence between Thorough Necessitism and Moderate Contingentism, given their apparent joint inconsistency.
29 April 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Thorough Necessitism, Moderate Contingentism and Theory Equivalence
Bruno Jacinto
University of St Andrews
Abstract: Consider a language containing only the propositional connectives, modal and actuality operators, first- and higher-order quantifiers, and identity. What is the true and most comprehensive theory formulated in this language? What is, in this sense, the correct higher-order modal logic? Elsewhere I have defended the necessary being of higher-order entities, as well as a plenitudinous comprehension principle for higher-order modal logic. This leaves two main candidate higher-order modal theories available, namely, Williamson’s Thorough Necessitism (Williamson, 2013, chs. 5-7) and Plantinga’s Moderate Contingentism (Plantinga, 1976). Prima facie, Thorough Necessitism implies the necessary being of every possible individual and Moderate Contingentism implies the contradictory of this thesis. Thus, the theories appear to be jointly inconsistent. The main aim of this talk is to show that the equivalence between Thorough Necessitism and Moderate Contingentism is a consequence of the Synonymy Account. This is an account of theory equivalence that I have developed and defended in other work and according to which, roughly, two theories are equivalent just in case (i) they assert of the same propositions that they stand in the same entailment relations, and (ii) they are committed to the truth of the same propositions. The equivalence between Thorough Necessitism and Moderate Contingentism implies that these theories are jointly consistent after all, despite appearances to the contrary. The equivalence between the theories also implies the stronger claim that they require the same of the world in order to be true. In this sense, there is no need to decide between them, and the dispute between their proponents is merely verbal. It will also be shown how sense can be made of the equivalence between Thorough Necessitism and Moderate Contingentism, given their apparent joint inconsistency.
Session 14
22 April 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Reading Session: "The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief", by David Chalmers
22 April 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Reading Session: "The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief", by David Chalmers
Session 13
8 April 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Is the Epistemic Externalist irrational (and irresponsible)?
Pedro Dinis
University of Lisbon
Abstract: I intend to examine critically one of the routes used by L. Bonjour to sustain that Epistemic Externalism is irrational (and irresponsible). One of Bonjour's aims (1985; 2003) is to attack the Reliabilism of A. Goldman. After changes of the reliabilist definition by Goldman, Bonjour recognizes one of them as the most suitable externalist perspective. Notwithstanding its suitability, Bonjour argues for its irrationality (and irresponsibility). Bergmann (2006) noticed some problems in the argumentation of Bonjour. My purpose here is to re-examine that same argumentation and present more and new problems. Bonjour's strategy didn’t work.
8 April 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Is the Epistemic Externalist irrational (and irresponsible)?
Pedro Dinis
University of Lisbon
Abstract: I intend to examine critically one of the routes used by L. Bonjour to sustain that Epistemic Externalism is irrational (and irresponsible). One of Bonjour's aims (1985; 2003) is to attack the Reliabilism of A. Goldman. After changes of the reliabilist definition by Goldman, Bonjour recognizes one of them as the most suitable externalist perspective. Notwithstanding its suitability, Bonjour argues for its irrationality (and irresponsibility). Bergmann (2006) noticed some problems in the argumentation of Bonjour. My purpose here is to re-examine that same argumentation and present more and new problems. Bonjour's strategy didn’t work.
Session 12
1 April 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Context as Shared Knowledge (joint work with Torfinn Huvenes)
Andreas Stokke
Umeå University
Abstract: According to one way of thinking of contexts for linguistic utterances, a context is a body of shared information. As developed in the work of Stalnaker, a context is seen as the body of information that the participants mutually accept for the purpose of the conversation. In addition, Stalnaker has suggested that this notion of context is fit to serve both as the kind of context that determines content and the kind of context that speech acts aim to update. This paper argues that the Stalnakerian notion of context cannot play the content-determining role of context. Instead, we propose to see a context as the body of information that is known by all the participants. We argue that, given certain assumptions, this notion of context can play both the content-determining and the updating role of contexts.
1 April 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Context as Shared Knowledge (joint work with Torfinn Huvenes)
Andreas Stokke
Umeå University
Abstract: According to one way of thinking of contexts for linguistic utterances, a context is a body of shared information. As developed in the work of Stalnaker, a context is seen as the body of information that the participants mutually accept for the purpose of the conversation. In addition, Stalnaker has suggested that this notion of context is fit to serve both as the kind of context that determines content and the kind of context that speech acts aim to update. This paper argues that the Stalnakerian notion of context cannot play the content-determining role of context. Instead, we propose to see a context as the body of information that is known by all the participants. We argue that, given certain assumptions, this notion of context can play both the content-determining and the updating role of contexts.
Session 11
18 March 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Argumentative plausibility
Fernando Furtado
University of Lisbon
Abstract: It is common to say that a good argument has at least three properties: it is valid (has an appropriate relation between premises and conclusion considering the nature of the argument), it has true premises and it is non-question-begging (taken together these properties are often called ‘cogency’). And if someone present an argument regarded cogent by yourself, then you have just two things to do: refute the argument or accept its conclusion (refute-or-accept rule). This rule is usually taken as a paradigm of rationality, but may have some interesting cases where we will want to say about someone who cannot follow the rule that he is not acting irrationally. In this talk I will present some of these cases. If they are legitimate, then the cogency is not sufficient to regulate the argumentative practice and we are not obliged to refute-or-accept an argument recognized by ourselves as cogent. Although I agree with this conclusion, I will offer a completely different notion capable to re-establish the rule refute-or-accept: the argumentative plausibility.
18 March 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Argumentative plausibility
Fernando Furtado
University of Lisbon
Abstract: It is common to say that a good argument has at least three properties: it is valid (has an appropriate relation between premises and conclusion considering the nature of the argument), it has true premises and it is non-question-begging (taken together these properties are often called ‘cogency’). And if someone present an argument regarded cogent by yourself, then you have just two things to do: refute the argument or accept its conclusion (refute-or-accept rule). This rule is usually taken as a paradigm of rationality, but may have some interesting cases where we will want to say about someone who cannot follow the rule that he is not acting irrationally. In this talk I will present some of these cases. If they are legitimate, then the cogency is not sufficient to regulate the argumentative practice and we are not obliged to refute-or-accept an argument recognized by ourselves as cogent. Although I agree with this conclusion, I will offer a completely different notion capable to re-establish the rule refute-or-accept: the argumentative plausibility.
Session 10
11 March 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
There Is More to the Picture Than Meets the Eye
Adriana Silva Graça
University of Lisbon
Abstract: In this talk I want to discuss the main ideas put forward by Kit Fine on his Semantic Relationism (2007) to solve the seemingly unsolvable Frege’s Puzzle pertaining on true identities which have at the same time cognitive value. Fine has his own formulation of the puzzle and a new idea on how to solve it preserving both two conflicting views to accomplish the task, i.e., the Referentialist and the Fregean underlying insights towards the desired solution. This has to be done by giving up the principle of compositionality which is accepted -as is well known- by both sides on the dispute. To achieve the semantic value of a sentence one has to take into account not only the semantic values of its parts but also the semantic relations between or among them. This idea seems promising. However, I will try to show that we will not obtain such a perfect result out of Fine’s proposal, as one might anticipate.
11 March 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
There Is More to the Picture Than Meets the Eye
Adriana Silva Graça
University of Lisbon
Abstract: In this talk I want to discuss the main ideas put forward by Kit Fine on his Semantic Relationism (2007) to solve the seemingly unsolvable Frege’s Puzzle pertaining on true identities which have at the same time cognitive value. Fine has his own formulation of the puzzle and a new idea on how to solve it preserving both two conflicting views to accomplish the task, i.e., the Referentialist and the Fregean underlying insights towards the desired solution. This has to be done by giving up the principle of compositionality which is accepted -as is well known- by both sides on the dispute. To achieve the semantic value of a sentence one has to take into account not only the semantic values of its parts but also the semantic relations between or among them. This idea seems promising. However, I will try to show that we will not obtain such a perfect result out of Fine’s proposal, as one might anticipate.
Session 9
4 March 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
What is the problem of replaceability?
Ricardo Miguel
University of Lisbon
Abstract: Singer’s argument of replaceability concerning non-self-conscious animals received immense attention in animal ethics literature. Yet, the debate around this argument has been mainly focused on arguing that Singer’s theory and, by association, utilitarianism in general, offers inadequate protection to animals – specially in contrast with rights theories. On the other hand, efforts to dismiss the argument without leaving utilitarian ground have not been duly appreciated. Furthermore, because Singer himself tried hard to restrict the argument's scope, and also because his defence of the irreplaceability of self-conscious beings was rather tentative, this kind of efforts do not seem misplaced. This tension, within utilitarianism, about how to best deal with the argument is the core of what I call ‘the problem of replaceability’. My main goal here is to provide a precise description of this problem. Firstly, I distinguish between the general question of replacement permissibility from the specific question of whether (a certain version of) utilitarianism implies the argument of replaceability. Focusing on the specific question I set the problem apart from other known objections to utilitarianism, like the value receptacles objection and some replacement-like difficulties. Finally, I point out how different interpretations of the argument affect the way out of the problem. I hope this understanding of the problem offers helpful insight to possible solutions and to further investigate its importance to animals’ moral status.
4 March 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
What is the problem of replaceability?
Ricardo Miguel
University of Lisbon
Abstract: Singer’s argument of replaceability concerning non-self-conscious animals received immense attention in animal ethics literature. Yet, the debate around this argument has been mainly focused on arguing that Singer’s theory and, by association, utilitarianism in general, offers inadequate protection to animals – specially in contrast with rights theories. On the other hand, efforts to dismiss the argument without leaving utilitarian ground have not been duly appreciated. Furthermore, because Singer himself tried hard to restrict the argument's scope, and also because his defence of the irreplaceability of self-conscious beings was rather tentative, this kind of efforts do not seem misplaced. This tension, within utilitarianism, about how to best deal with the argument is the core of what I call ‘the problem of replaceability’. My main goal here is to provide a precise description of this problem. Firstly, I distinguish between the general question of replacement permissibility from the specific question of whether (a certain version of) utilitarianism implies the argument of replaceability. Focusing on the specific question I set the problem apart from other known objections to utilitarianism, like the value receptacles objection and some replacement-like difficulties. Finally, I point out how different interpretations of the argument affect the way out of the problem. I hope this understanding of the problem offers helpful insight to possible solutions and to further investigate its importance to animals’ moral status.
Session 8
26 February 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Categoricity proofs and mathematical knowledge
Fernando Ferreira
University of Lisbon
Abstract: Second-order consequence is not a good epistemological notion because it is not derivability based (as opposed to first-order consequence). The main thesis of this talk is that second-order categorical axiomatizations are nevertheless highly significant for the epistemology of mathematics. The thesis is neutral with regard to object platonism but endorses a methodological platonism, according to which the work of the mathematician in studying categorical notions is harmonious with an abstract mathematical reality. Some conclusions are drawn. Firstly, that (in general) a categorical mathematical notion is fully operational only if other notions are permitted to come into play. Secondly, that even though (ordinary) mathematics can be pursued with absolute rigor, mathematics itself cannot be pursued with absolute certainty.
26 February 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Categoricity proofs and mathematical knowledge
Fernando Ferreira
University of Lisbon
Abstract: Second-order consequence is not a good epistemological notion because it is not derivability based (as opposed to first-order consequence). The main thesis of this talk is that second-order categorical axiomatizations are nevertheless highly significant for the epistemology of mathematics. The thesis is neutral with regard to object platonism but endorses a methodological platonism, according to which the work of the mathematician in studying categorical notions is harmonious with an abstract mathematical reality. Some conclusions are drawn. Firstly, that (in general) a categorical mathematical notion is fully operational only if other notions are permitted to come into play. Secondly, that even though (ordinary) mathematics can be pursued with absolute rigor, mathematics itself cannot be pursued with absolute certainty.
Session 7
19 February 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Can expressivists solve their problem with negation?
Luís Veríssimo
University of Lisbon
Abstract: In this talk I intend to discuss the merits of Mark Schroeder’s solution to the Negation Problem. The Negation Problem might be considered a particular feature of the renowned Frege-Geach Problem, a broader problem faced by metaethical theories under the non-cognitivist banner, such as expressivism. The problem consists in trying to account for the inconsistency between any given moral claim and its negation within a non-cognitivist framework. Schroeder (2008) claims to have found a way to solve this problem which accounts not only for the notion of logical inconsistency, but also for the notions of logical entailment and logic validity involved in the broader problem. He suggests that any given moral sentence is to be understood as the expression of a general non-cognitive attitude, like being for, towards a particular descriptive property or relation, like blaming for. He also claims that, of all the semantic approaches to moral discourse available to an expressivist, this is the only one with the adequate structure to deal with the negation problem. Is he right? Isn’t this solution a bit ad hoc? Can expressivists really solve the Negation Problem?
19 February 2016, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Can expressivists solve their problem with negation?
Luís Veríssimo
University of Lisbon
Abstract: In this talk I intend to discuss the merits of Mark Schroeder’s solution to the Negation Problem. The Negation Problem might be considered a particular feature of the renowned Frege-Geach Problem, a broader problem faced by metaethical theories under the non-cognitivist banner, such as expressivism. The problem consists in trying to account for the inconsistency between any given moral claim and its negation within a non-cognitivist framework. Schroeder (2008) claims to have found a way to solve this problem which accounts not only for the notion of logical inconsistency, but also for the notions of logical entailment and logic validity involved in the broader problem. He suggests that any given moral sentence is to be understood as the expression of a general non-cognitive attitude, like being for, towards a particular descriptive property or relation, like blaming for. He also claims that, of all the semantic approaches to moral discourse available to an expressivist, this is the only one with the adequate structure to deal with the negation problem. Is he right? Isn’t this solution a bit ad hoc? Can expressivists really solve the Negation Problem?
Session 6
18 December 2015, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Predicativism and the Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names
Manuel García-Carpintero
University of Barcelona
Abstract: I compare two metalinguistic accounts of names, predicativism and a presuppositional account I have been defending over the years, on both of which the semantic contribution of N is (an elaboration of) being called N. Following early work by Burge, Delia Graf Fara and others have been advocating a predicativist account, on which names semantically behave like predicates (Fara, Philosophical Review 2015). The presuppositional view on names I defend shares some features with these views, but it also differs in important respects. The presuppositional account I advocate incorporates both elements of “metalinguistic” proposals and of Kripke’s own causal-historical communication chain. On this view, a proper name N contributes x to the content of the main speech act made by the utterance including it given an associated ancillary presupposition, that x is whoever or whatever is called N. There is a connection with predicativist views here; but in my view we do not need to go as far as denying a purely referential, central use for proper names.
18 December 2015, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Predicativism and the Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names
Manuel García-Carpintero
University of Barcelona
Abstract: I compare two metalinguistic accounts of names, predicativism and a presuppositional account I have been defending over the years, on both of which the semantic contribution of N is (an elaboration of) being called N. Following early work by Burge, Delia Graf Fara and others have been advocating a predicativist account, on which names semantically behave like predicates (Fara, Philosophical Review 2015). The presuppositional view on names I defend shares some features with these views, but it also differs in important respects. The presuppositional account I advocate incorporates both elements of “metalinguistic” proposals and of Kripke’s own causal-historical communication chain. On this view, a proper name N contributes x to the content of the main speech act made by the utterance including it given an associated ancillary presupposition, that x is whoever or whatever is called N. There is a connection with predicativist views here; but in my view we do not need to go as far as denying a purely referential, central use for proper names.
Session 5
18 December 2015, 12:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Pejoratives: How the analogy with fiction breaks down
Teresa Marques
Pompeu Fabra University
Abstract: Chris Hom & Robert May (2015) have recently argued that pejoratives are like fictional words: Pejoratives express complex socially constructed, negative properties determined in virtue of standing in causal external relations to racist ideologies and social practices. On their view, pejoratives have null extensions and their use expresses false propositions; pejorative discourse is analogous to fictional discourse.
I argue Hom & May’s appeal to fiction is mistaken. There is an important disanalogy between fictional discourse and pejorative discourse: there are relevant uses of fictional discourse that do not presuppose the speaker’s commitment to the fiction, but parallel uses of pejorative discourse do presuppose such a commitment to racist ideologies.
Moreover, assuming a semantic analysis of the sort they advocate, pejoratives have non-empty extensions, and, hence, it does not follow that their use (always) express false propositions, which is a crucial disanalogy with fictional discourse.
18 December 2015, 12:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Pejoratives: How the analogy with fiction breaks down
Teresa Marques
Pompeu Fabra University
Abstract: Chris Hom & Robert May (2015) have recently argued that pejoratives are like fictional words: Pejoratives express complex socially constructed, negative properties determined in virtue of standing in causal external relations to racist ideologies and social practices. On their view, pejoratives have null extensions and their use expresses false propositions; pejorative discourse is analogous to fictional discourse.
I argue Hom & May’s appeal to fiction is mistaken. There is an important disanalogy between fictional discourse and pejorative discourse: there are relevant uses of fictional discourse that do not presuppose the speaker’s commitment to the fiction, but parallel uses of pejorative discourse do presuppose such a commitment to racist ideologies.
Moreover, assuming a semantic analysis of the sort they advocate, pejoratives have non-empty extensions, and, hence, it does not follow that their use (always) express false propositions, which is a crucial disanalogy with fictional discourse.
Session 4
11 December 2015, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Does Classical Restriction Say Anything?
Ricardo Santos
University of Lisbon
Abstract: The Classical Restriction response to the semantic paradoxes takes them to show that the T-Schema has to have its application restricted only to utterances or sentences which express some thought or proposition. Pathological utterances or sentences express no thought, hence they have no truth conditions. This standard response to the paradoxes faces well-known difficulties. Recently, Ian Rumfitt has raised one more difficulty (which he describes as an ‘intensional paradox’) and has proposed a way to solve it. Here I discuss Rumfitt’s proposed solution, and I argue that it fails, because it undermines the Classical Restriction response.
11 December 2015, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Does Classical Restriction Say Anything?
Ricardo Santos
University of Lisbon
Abstract: The Classical Restriction response to the semantic paradoxes takes them to show that the T-Schema has to have its application restricted only to utterances or sentences which express some thought or proposition. Pathological utterances or sentences express no thought, hence they have no truth conditions. This standard response to the paradoxes faces well-known difficulties. Recently, Ian Rumfitt has raised one more difficulty (which he describes as an ‘intensional paradox’) and has proposed a way to solve it. Here I discuss Rumfitt’s proposed solution, and I argue that it fails, because it undermines the Classical Restriction response.
Session 3
27 November 2015, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Testimonial Warrant: a pluralistic approach
Domingos Faria
University of Lisbon
Abstract: In this talk I want to argue that the two dominant views on testimonial warrant, namely reductionism and non-reductionism, face serious objections. On the one hand, if reductionism is an adequate account, testimonial warrant will be too hard for some cases; but, on the other hand, if non-reductionism is an adequate account, then testimonial warrant will be too easy for other cases. Based on such problems, I will show that not all cases of testimonial warrant are epistemically homogeneous nor should they get the same treatment. So, instead of a unified account of testimonial warrant, I will explore a pluralistic account, following Edward Craig (1990) and John Greco (2015), in which there are at least two kinds of testimonial warrant: one in which testimony works as an acquisition source and another in which testimony works as a distribution mechanism. Finally, I will survey some consequences that this new account of testimonial warrant may have for religious beliefs based on testimony.
27 November 2015, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Testimonial Warrant: a pluralistic approach
Domingos Faria
University of Lisbon
Abstract: In this talk I want to argue that the two dominant views on testimonial warrant, namely reductionism and non-reductionism, face serious objections. On the one hand, if reductionism is an adequate account, testimonial warrant will be too hard for some cases; but, on the other hand, if non-reductionism is an adequate account, then testimonial warrant will be too easy for other cases. Based on such problems, I will show that not all cases of testimonial warrant are epistemically homogeneous nor should they get the same treatment. So, instead of a unified account of testimonial warrant, I will explore a pluralistic account, following Edward Craig (1990) and John Greco (2015), in which there are at least two kinds of testimonial warrant: one in which testimony works as an acquisition source and another in which testimony works as a distribution mechanism. Finally, I will survey some consequences that this new account of testimonial warrant may have for religious beliefs based on testimony.
Session 2
20 November 2015, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
The unmitigated reply
Diogo Santos
University of Lisbon
Abstract: The realist view about matters of taste claims that (R1) taste predicates are true of some things and false of others and (R2) whether a taste predicate is true or false of a thing, on a particular occasion, does not depend on the idiosyncratic tastes of the speaker, assessor, or anyone else (Macfarlane 2014). Kölbel (2004) argues that what he calls the unmitigated realist view is unattractive, mainly because «it does nothing to account for the difference between those topics on which we are inclined to say that faultless disagreement is possible and those where we are not». I will show that this is too quick, for the unmitigated realist has resources to account for the difference between topics of discourse «where we are inclined to say that faultless disagreement is possible (namely discourse about matters of taste) and those where we are not».
20 November 2015, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
The unmitigated reply
Diogo Santos
University of Lisbon
Abstract: The realist view about matters of taste claims that (R1) taste predicates are true of some things and false of others and (R2) whether a taste predicate is true or false of a thing, on a particular occasion, does not depend on the idiosyncratic tastes of the speaker, assessor, or anyone else (Macfarlane 2014). Kölbel (2004) argues that what he calls the unmitigated realist view is unattractive, mainly because «it does nothing to account for the difference between those topics on which we are inclined to say that faultless disagreement is possible and those where we are not». I will show that this is too quick, for the unmitigated realist has resources to account for the difference between topics of discourse «where we are inclined to say that faultless disagreement is possible (namely discourse about matters of taste) and those where we are not».
Session 1
23 October 2015, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Against the World
Elia Zardini
University of Lisbon
Abstract: In previous works, I’ve developed a theory of transparent truth (LW) and a theory of tolerant baldness (NLS) which validate the law of excluded middle (LEM) and the law of non-contradiction (LNC), and which solve the semantic paradoxes and the paradoxes of vagueness by restricting instead the structural properties of contraction and transitivity respectively. Moreover, the principle of distributivity of conjunction over disjunction (D) fails in the systems—in fact, even the weaker principles of modularity (M) and orthomodularity (O) fail. However, since neither kind of paradox seems to involve D, M or O in the first place, it might seem that the solutions I’ve proposed feature logics that are unnecessarily weak. I’ll first argue that these appearances are deceiving: if a non-contractive or non-transitive theory of anything making certain natural assumptions (which crucially include LEM and LNC and which are shared by both LW and NLS) is on anything like the right track, D, M and O just have to fail. I’ll then offer a philosophical explanation of the failures of these principles in LW and NLS, which will require to bring out a common, hitherto unnoticed metaphysical consequence of these systems, and which will thus have the upshot of bringing for the first time together two systems that might up to now have seemed very remote from one another. More in detail, I’ll show that both LW and NLS assert the non-existence of the world, and that such assertion in turn implies the relevant instances of LEM; I’ll then argue that these circumstances explain the failure of D, M and O, since these principles allow one to go from the disjunctions of facts licenced by LEM to a disjunction of complete ways things are, with the latter contradicting the non-existence of the world.
23 October 2015, 16:00
Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa, Sala Mattos Romão (Dep. de Filosofia)
Against the World
Elia Zardini
University of Lisbon
Abstract: In previous works, I’ve developed a theory of transparent truth (LW) and a theory of tolerant baldness (NLS) which validate the law of excluded middle (LEM) and the law of non-contradiction (LNC), and which solve the semantic paradoxes and the paradoxes of vagueness by restricting instead the structural properties of contraction and transitivity respectively. Moreover, the principle of distributivity of conjunction over disjunction (D) fails in the systems—in fact, even the weaker principles of modularity (M) and orthomodularity (O) fail. However, since neither kind of paradox seems to involve D, M or O in the first place, it might seem that the solutions I’ve proposed feature logics that are unnecessarily weak. I’ll first argue that these appearances are deceiving: if a non-contractive or non-transitive theory of anything making certain natural assumptions (which crucially include LEM and LNC and which are shared by both LW and NLS) is on anything like the right track, D, M and O just have to fail. I’ll then offer a philosophical explanation of the failures of these principles in LW and NLS, which will require to bring out a common, hitherto unnoticed metaphysical consequence of these systems, and which will thus have the upshot of bringing for the first time together two systems that might up to now have seemed very remote from one another. More in detail, I’ll show that both LW and NLS assert the non-existence of the world, and that such assertion in turn implies the relevant instances of LEM; I’ll then argue that these circumstances explain the failure of D, M and O, since these principles allow one to go from the disjunctions of facts licenced by LEM to a disjunction of complete ways things are, with the latter contradicting the non-existence of the world.
