Mini-Course on Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology
Christoph Kelp
KU Leuven
19 April 2017, 16:00-18:00, room 5.2
20 April 2017, 16:00-18:00, room 2.13
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Abstract: This mini-course will discuss the “Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology” account, which combines virtue epistemology with knowledge first epistemology. It is virtue epistemological in that it ventures to analyse justified belief in terms of epistemic ability. It is knowledge first epistemological in that, unlike traditional virtue epistemology, it does not unpack the notion of an epistemic ability as an ability to form true beliefs but as an ability to know, thus offering a definition of justified belief in terms of knowledge. Two further goals are to show (i) that this account offers promising solutions to a number of central problems in epistemology, including Gettier cases, the lottery paradox, the new evil demon problem and clairvoyant cases and (ii) that it therefore compares favourably with both its traditional virtue epistemological and other knowledge first epistemological rivals all of which fail to provide satisfactory solutions to at least some of these problems.
Free attendance
KU Leuven
19 April 2017, 16:00-18:00, room 5.2
20 April 2017, 16:00-18:00, room 2.13
Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon
Abstract: This mini-course will discuss the “Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology” account, which combines virtue epistemology with knowledge first epistemology. It is virtue epistemological in that it ventures to analyse justified belief in terms of epistemic ability. It is knowledge first epistemological in that, unlike traditional virtue epistemology, it does not unpack the notion of an epistemic ability as an ability to form true beliefs but as an ability to know, thus offering a definition of justified belief in terms of knowledge. Two further goals are to show (i) that this account offers promising solutions to a number of central problems in epistemology, including Gettier cases, the lottery paradox, the new evil demon problem and clairvoyant cases and (ii) that it therefore compares favourably with both its traditional virtue epistemological and other knowledge first epistemological rivals all of which fail to provide satisfactory solutions to at least some of these problems.
Free attendance
