Varieties of Truth, Varieties of Realism
Integrated Action LanCog, Univ. Lisbon & Logos, Univ. of Barcelona
Aims
The aim of this project is to critically examine different strategies that the debates between realists and anti-realists have pursued in different areas, strategies that appeal to different conceptual resources from contemporary philosophy of language in the analysis of the types of discourses involved.We will consider three illustrations. The anti-realist in mathematics wants to assert (1); the anti-realist in ethics asserts (2); the anti-realist about fiction wants to assert (3):
1. There are no numbers.
2. There are no moral facts.
3. There are no fictional characters.
However, anti-realists do not want to straightforwardly correct commonsense, which accepts as a matter of course (4)-(6); but the problem is that they appear to entail propositions inconsistent with what they want to say:
4. There are prime numbers between 2 and 6.
5. Killing babies for fun is wrong.
6. In some novels, there are important fictional characters who are not introduced by the author till more than halfway through the works.
The traditional analytic literature offers two options for the antirealist, two ways of saying that (4)-(6) only state what is apparently the case, not what is really the case.
i.Nonfactualism. According to the first, metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is “objective” or “factual”. This antirealist denies that there are any facts “out there” in virtue of which the propositions of the contested domains such as (4)-(6) might be true. The propositions of the domain are not in the “business” of stating such facts; they serve merely to indicate our engagement with the world without stating, in objective fashion, how the world is. The problem with this approach is that the disputed propositions appear to have the feature that is denied of them: thus, (4)-(6) are candidates for truth, capable of being believed or asserted, or of figuring in inferences, or of being embedded in larger linguistic contexts
ii.Reductivism. According to the second conception, metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is “irreducible” or “fundamental”. On this view, reality is constituted by certain irreducible or fundamental facts; and in denying reality to a given domain, the antirealist is claiming that its facts are all reducible (though semantic analysis, or at least by showing their modal equivalence) to facts of some other sort.
Thus, for instance, in the debate about fictional characters pretence-theorists such as Kendall Walton pursue both strategies, arguing that (6) is not primarily put forward as an assertion, but merely as a form of make-believe; only secondarily can it be understood as an assertion, but in that case its content can be paraphrased in such a way that no commitment to fictional characters transpires. A sceptical alternative to both strategies is the neo-Carnapian view that ontological debates are merely terminological, with different parties simply assuming different stipulations about how to understand the crucial expressions at stake, the quantifiers and the referential apparatus in particular. The LOGOS conference on Metametaphysics, which took place in June 2008 explored that option, examined in depth in a recent compilation edited by David Chalmers, David Manley and Ryan Wasserman, Metametaphysics, OUP 2009.
Another intriguing possibility for anti-realists in some fields is truth-relativism, a proposal first made in the recent literature by John MacFarlane as a way of dealing with puzzling features of future contingents, and by Max Kölbel in connection with ethical claims such as (5). The issue was explored in a workshop put together by Max Kölbel and Manuel García-Carpintero, which took place in Barcelona in September 2005, with the participation of some of the participants in this proposal. Since then one more workshop took place in Barcelona in April 2006, and another one is going to take place in June 2007. An intriguing new form of truth-relativism is explored by Mark Sainsbury in his forthcoming book Fiction and Fictionalism, with the aim of defending a form of anti-realism concerning fictional characters in claims such as (6); Sainsbury articulates a notion of presupposition-relative truth and assertion which is at least worth exploring. Our goal is to continue examining together these issues of common interest for researchers in the two groups, by organizing two workshops focussing on them and through the post-doctoral exchanges proposed here.
1. There are no numbers.
2. There are no moral facts.
3. There are no fictional characters.
However, anti-realists do not want to straightforwardly correct commonsense, which accepts as a matter of course (4)-(6); but the problem is that they appear to entail propositions inconsistent with what they want to say:
4. There are prime numbers between 2 and 6.
5. Killing babies for fun is wrong.
6. In some novels, there are important fictional characters who are not introduced by the author till more than halfway through the works.
The traditional analytic literature offers two options for the antirealist, two ways of saying that (4)-(6) only state what is apparently the case, not what is really the case.
i.Nonfactualism. According to the first, metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is “objective” or “factual”. This antirealist denies that there are any facts “out there” in virtue of which the propositions of the contested domains such as (4)-(6) might be true. The propositions of the domain are not in the “business” of stating such facts; they serve merely to indicate our engagement with the world without stating, in objective fashion, how the world is. The problem with this approach is that the disputed propositions appear to have the feature that is denied of them: thus, (4)-(6) are candidates for truth, capable of being believed or asserted, or of figuring in inferences, or of being embedded in larger linguistic contexts
ii.Reductivism. According to the second conception, metaphysical reality is to be identified with what is “irreducible” or “fundamental”. On this view, reality is constituted by certain irreducible or fundamental facts; and in denying reality to a given domain, the antirealist is claiming that its facts are all reducible (though semantic analysis, or at least by showing their modal equivalence) to facts of some other sort.
Thus, for instance, in the debate about fictional characters pretence-theorists such as Kendall Walton pursue both strategies, arguing that (6) is not primarily put forward as an assertion, but merely as a form of make-believe; only secondarily can it be understood as an assertion, but in that case its content can be paraphrased in such a way that no commitment to fictional characters transpires. A sceptical alternative to both strategies is the neo-Carnapian view that ontological debates are merely terminological, with different parties simply assuming different stipulations about how to understand the crucial expressions at stake, the quantifiers and the referential apparatus in particular. The LOGOS conference on Metametaphysics, which took place in June 2008 explored that option, examined in depth in a recent compilation edited by David Chalmers, David Manley and Ryan Wasserman, Metametaphysics, OUP 2009.
Another intriguing possibility for anti-realists in some fields is truth-relativism, a proposal first made in the recent literature by John MacFarlane as a way of dealing with puzzling features of future contingents, and by Max Kölbel in connection with ethical claims such as (5). The issue was explored in a workshop put together by Max Kölbel and Manuel García-Carpintero, which took place in Barcelona in September 2005, with the participation of some of the participants in this proposal. Since then one more workshop took place in Barcelona in April 2006, and another one is going to take place in June 2007. An intriguing new form of truth-relativism is explored by Mark Sainsbury in his forthcoming book Fiction and Fictionalism, with the aim of defending a form of anti-realism concerning fictional characters in claims such as (6); Sainsbury articulates a notion of presupposition-relative truth and assertion which is at least worth exploring. Our goal is to continue examining together these issues of common interest for researchers in the two groups, by organizing two workshops focussing on them and through the post-doctoral exchanges proposed here.
Further goals of the project
Current research converges on the need for a finer classification of the anti-realist options. The general objectives of our project are:
The general framework of the project is the study of the semantics of natural languages and its ontological implications, but the project is also concerned with the philosophy of mind – when evaluating the relevance of relativism and other forms of anti-realism for conceptual content, and even for some kinds of non-conceptual content (perception, memory).
- To establish a typology of the forms of an anti-realist strategy, on the basis of a detailed study of the various classes of expressions and phenomena mentioned above;
- To discuss the value and legitimacy of semantic relativism as a general theory of meaning;
- To determine how the articulation of the different strategies affects the traditional division between semantics and pragmatics.
The general framework of the project is the study of the semantics of natural languages and its ontological implications, but the project is also concerned with the philosophy of mind – when evaluating the relevance of relativism and other forms of anti-realism for conceptual content, and even for some kinds of non-conceptual content (perception, memory).
Value of the project
By taking advantage of the synergies developed in the collaboration between the two groups, this project seeks to make significant advances with respect to its three major research objectives, as indicated before:
- To provide a unified framework for the study of realism that allows for a principled diagnosis of why realist or anti-realist views seem more apt in some areas than in others, while doing justice to the differences between those areas;
- To provide a novel systematic account of realism and its anti-realist counterparts and to apply and test them in those different areas;
- To make new contributions to the study of relativism and its competitors and its semantic underpinnings.
Background and previous results
Logos has organized the following scientific meetings on the project’s subject:
Some Logos recent publications on the project’s subject:
LanCog has organized the following scientific meetings on the project’s subject:
Some Lancog recent publications on the project’s subject:
- Relativizing Utterance Truth, 2005
- BW5, Non-Truth-Conditional Aspects of Meaning, 2007
- Scientific Models: Semantics and Ontology, 2007
- Metametaphysics, 2008
- Singular Thought, 2009
- BW6, Reference and Non-Existence, 2009
Some Logos recent publications on the project’s subject:
- Prades, J. Ll. “Varieties of Internal Relations”, Teorema, vol. 25/1, pp. 137—155. 2006.
- Rosenkranz, S., “Metaethics, Agnosticism, and Logic”, Dialectica 60 (2006), 47–61.
- Díez, J. A. “Rationality in Normal Science and the Structure of Theories”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 38, 2007 pp. 543 –554.
- García-Carpintero, Manuel “Fiction-Making as an Illocutionary Act”, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 2007.
- García-Carpintero, Manuel “A Non-Modal Conception of Secondary Properties” Philosophical Papers, Rep. Sudáfrica, 2007.
- Martí, Genoveva, “Identity, Substitution and the Subject-Predicate Structure.” M. O’Rourke and C. Washington (eds.): Situating Semantics. MIT Press, 2007, pp. 93-115.
- Martínez Fernández, J., Review of Graham Priest, 'In Contradiction. A Study of the Transconsistent', Oxford University Press, 2006, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2007.
- Rosenkranz, Sven, “Agnosticism as a Third Stance”, Mind 116 (2007), 55–104.
- Zeman, Dan “Context Sensitivity: Contextualism, Indexicalism, Relativism”, en B. Kokinov & al. (Eds.),Modeling and Using Context, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intellingence, Springer, 2007.
- Zeman, Dan “Relativism and Alethic Functionalism”, in Organon F, Vol. XIV, No. 1, 2007, pp.53-71.
- Zeman, Dan “Overcoming the Obstacles to the Relativity of Truth”, in Organon F, Vol. XIV, No. 2, 2007, pp.232-241.
- Prades, J. Ll., “El realismo y el limbo de las posibilidades no realizadas”, Teorema, xxvii, no.1, pp. 109 –123, 2008.
- Prades, J. Ll., “Acting without Reasons”, Disputatio , Vol. II, no. 23, pp. 229—246, 2008.
- Rosenkranz, S., “Knowability, Closure, and Anti-Realism”, Dialectica 62 (2008), 59–75.
- Rosenkranz, S., “Frege, Relativism, and Faultless Disagreement”, in: García-Carpintero, M./Kölbel, M. (eds.), Relative Truth, Oxford 2008: Oxford University Press, 225–237.
- García-Carpintero, Manuel, 'Voltolini’s Ficta', Dialectica (Suiza) 63, 1 (2009), 57-66.
- García-Carpintero, Manuel, (with Manuel Pérez-Otero) ‘The Conventional and the Analytic’,Philosophy and Phenomenological research, 78, 2, 2009, 239-274.
- Martí, Genoveva, “Against Semantic Multiculturalism.” Analysis, 69 (2009), pp. 42-48.
- Rosenkranz, S., ‘Liberalism, Entitlement, and Verdict Exclusion’, in: Kallestrup, J./Pritchard, D. (eds.), special issue of Synthese on the philosophy of Crispin Wright (published online first, forthcoming in print 2009).
- García-Carpintero, Manuel, ‘Fictional Entities, Theoretical Models and Figurative Truth’, in Frigg, R, and Hunter, M. (eds.), Beyond Mimesis and Convention – Representation in Art and Science, Springer, forthcoming.
- García-Carpintero, Manuel, ‘Fictional Singular Imaginings’, in Jeshion, R. (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
- Martínez Fernández, José “On the Reliability of Experience and the Norm of Revision”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
- Rosenkranz, S., ‘Agnosticism and Vagueness’, in: Dietz, R./Moruzzi, S. (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Essays on the Nature and Logic of Vagueness, Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming 2009).
- Zeman, D. “Review of Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne, Relativism and Monadic Truth, OUP, 2009, forthcoming in Disputatio.
- Zeman, D. “Knowledge Attributions and Relevant Contexts”, forthcoming in F. Recanati, I. Stojanovic and N. Villanueva, Context-Dependency, Relativism and Perspective, de Gruyter, 2009.
LanCog has organized the following scientific meetings on the project’s subject:
- 1st Lisbon Workshop on Semantics, 2006.
- Workshop on Negation and Denial, 2008.
Some Lancog recent publications on the project’s subject:
- Branquinho, J. Metafísica. Uma Introdução Logicamente Disciplinada a Problemas Centrais de Metafísica. Lisboa: Gradiva, 2009 (no prelo).
- Duarte d’Almeida, L. ‘Norme Giuridiche Complete’, Analisi e Diritto 2009 (accepted, forthcoming)
- Duarte d’Almeida, L. ‘Description, Ascription, and Action in Criminal Law’, Ratio Juris 20 (2007) 170-195.
- Ferreira, F. "The co-ordination principles: a problem for bilateralism", Mind 2009.
- Ferreira, F. "A most artistic package of a jumble of ideas", Dialectica 2009.
- Galvão, P. Do Ponto de Vista do Universo: Um Estudo sobre a Racionalidade da Ética Consequencialista, Lisboa, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, 2008.
- Lopes, A. O Valor de um Bach Autêntico: um Estudo sobre a Autenticidade na Execução de Obras Musicais. Dissertação de Doutoramento, Universidade de Lisboa, 2008
- Lopes, A. “Relativismo na Avaliação de Execuções Musicais”, Philosophica, nº 27, 2006.
- Marques, T. “What Can Modes Do for (Moderate) Relativism?”, Critica, (forthcoming). (Mexico)
- Marques, T. “The square of opposition and the paradoxes”, Logica Universalis, vol. 2 no. 1, pp 87-105, 2008.
- Marques, T. (ed.). Normativity and Rationality, special issue of Disputatio, May 2008.
- Santos, G. Uma Introdução à Lógica Intuicionista (aceite para publicação) Crítica, (2008) (Portugal)
- Santos, P. “Context-sensitivity and (indicative) conditionals”, Disputatio, volume II, no 24, pp. 295-314, 2008.
- Santos, P. “Condicionais e Alguma Pragmática” in Actas do 2º Encontro Nacional de Filosofia Analítica, Faculdade de Letras do Porto, 2005.
- Silva Graça, A. “A Lesson to Learn from Referential Uses of Definite Descriptions”, The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, Volume 27, Issue 1, Themes from Russell and Meinong. Edited by Nicholas Griffin, Dale Jacquette and Kenneth Blackwell, 2006
- Silva, R. “Wittgenstein and the Problem of Cultural Relativism”, in G. Gasser, C. Kanzian e E. Runggaldier (eds.), Cultures: Conflict – Analysis – Dialogue, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society, 2006, pp. 319-22.
- Teixeira, C. “Justificações Inferenciais”, Análise, Série II, n. º 1, 2005
- Teixeira, C. “Empirismo Eliminativista”, in Miguens, S., J.A. & Mauro, C. (ed.), Analyses/Análises, Porto: Faculdade e Letras da Universidade do Porto, 2006.
Planned activities
On its side, the Spanish group will continue its regular seminars, within the framework of the group LOGOS, on the topics of the project. The following reading groups have taken place during 2008-9: teleonomy; causality in biology, physics and economics; pragmatics; semantics; meta-ethics; reference in fiction. In the Logos Seminar, current work of the members of the project is extensively discussed. For more information, confer: http://www.ub.es/grc_logos/.
The Project of Integrated Action will offer an ideal framework for the development of these ongoing projects focusing on semantics and metaphysics. It will provide a high-level environment for debates whose results will contribute significantly to several ongoing research projects (doctoral theses, papers, and so on), and will open new perspectives. In order to achieve our goals, we will promote the active participation of project members to the seminars of both institutions. We will rely on the technical equipment of Universitat de Barcelona and Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa in order to organize regular on-line meetings, during which the two teams will be able to communicate their results to each other.
The methodology will be similar in both groups. The study of contextual dependence, relativism, and of issues in metaphysics has been going on at the LanCog group for some years now. During the academic year of 2007-8, discussion on issues in metaphilosophy was carried out at the Internal Seminar, with the study of The Philosophy of Philosophy by Timothy Williamson (Wiley-Blackwell, 2007). During the academic year of 2008-9, it has continued at the LanCog group, with discussions in the Internal Seminar and at the Analytic Philosophy Seminar, covering issues on semantic minimalism, contextualism and relativism, through the study of recent papers and the discussion of work of project members. A conference will take place in Lisbon to confront the results of the two teams in 2010.
The Project of Integrated Action will offer an ideal framework for the development of these ongoing projects focusing on semantics and metaphysics. It will provide a high-level environment for debates whose results will contribute significantly to several ongoing research projects (doctoral theses, papers, and so on), and will open new perspectives. In order to achieve our goals, we will promote the active participation of project members, mostly that of doctoral students and post-doctoral researchers (but also of senior members) to the seminars of both institutions. We will rely on the technical equipment of Universitat de Barcelona and of Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa in order to organize regular on-line meetings, during which the two teams will be able to communicate their results to each other.
A second conference involving the members of the two groups will take place in Barcelona in 2011. The work will appear in a collective volume devoted to varieties of truth and realism.
The project will consolidate an ongoing relation between two groups with similar research interests. It includes, on the Portuguese side, the teams of philosophy of language and of mind of the LanCog (Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa) and, on the Spanish side, the team LOGOS (Grup de Recerca in Logica, Llenguatge i Cognició) of the University of Barcelona. Both groups are very similar in their focus of interest (language, logic, cognition and epistemology, formal ontology and philosophy of science), in their way of operating, and in their international projection. They maintain regular scientific relations, and have organized a series of common activities.
Members of LOGOS including Manuel García-Carpintero, Genoveva Martí, José Martínez, Manuel Pérez, Josep Ll. Prades and Sven Rosenkranz participate in the advisory or editorial boards of Disputatio, a prestigious international philosophy journal edited by LanCog.
João Branquinho, Adriana Silva and Teresa Marques collaborated in the VIII Coloquio Iberoamericano de Filosofía, held in Barcelona in 2003.
Teresa Marques visited LOGOS for two periods of three months in 2006 and in 2007. In the academic year 2007-8, she held a grant for “Stays of Young Foreign Researchers” of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation to do research at the Universitat de Barcelona. Teresa Marques has been a member of the Logos Group at the University of Barcelona since 2007.
Teresa Marques participated at BW5, the Fifth Barcelona Workshop in Issues in the Theory of Reference, held in Barcelona in 2007, with the presentation “Embedding Emotions”.
Adriana Silva Graça participated at the LOGOS Workshop with Saul Kripke Meaning and Use in December 2005, with the presentation “The Semantic Relevance of Speaker’s Linguistic Intuicions”.
Manuel García-Carpintero was in the committees for the Master Theses of Célia Teixeira and Gonçalo Santos, members of LanCog. Gonçalo Santos later became a Ph. D. student at LOGOS, under the supervision of José Martínez.
João Branquinho was in the committee for the PhD Thesis of Dan Lopez de Sá, a Logos member and ICREA Junior Researcher at the University of Barcelona.
Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, José Martínez, Dan Zeman, Max Kölbel, Manuel Pérez, Chiara Panizza, Sónia Roca, Josep Ll. Prades, Josep Maciá, Oscar Cabaco, and other LOGOS members, participated at the ECAP5, the Fifth European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, organized by Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (CFUL) (with the local organizing committee including João Branquinho, then president of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy, and Teresa Marques), and Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, Max Kölbel, Dan Zeman, participated at the ENFA3, the Third Meeting of the Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy, also organized by CFUL, (with the local organizing committee including João Branquinho and António Lopes).
The Project of Integrated Action will offer an ideal framework for the development of these ongoing projects focusing on semantics and metaphysics. It will provide a high-level environment for debates whose results will contribute significantly to several ongoing research projects (doctoral theses, papers, and so on), and will open new perspectives. In order to achieve our goals, we will promote the active participation of project members to the seminars of both institutions. We will rely on the technical equipment of Universitat de Barcelona and Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa in order to organize regular on-line meetings, during which the two teams will be able to communicate their results to each other.
The methodology will be similar in both groups. The study of contextual dependence, relativism, and of issues in metaphysics has been going on at the LanCog group for some years now. During the academic year of 2007-8, discussion on issues in metaphilosophy was carried out at the Internal Seminar, with the study of The Philosophy of Philosophy by Timothy Williamson (Wiley-Blackwell, 2007). During the academic year of 2008-9, it has continued at the LanCog group, with discussions in the Internal Seminar and at the Analytic Philosophy Seminar, covering issues on semantic minimalism, contextualism and relativism, through the study of recent papers and the discussion of work of project members. A conference will take place in Lisbon to confront the results of the two teams in 2010.
The Project of Integrated Action will offer an ideal framework for the development of these ongoing projects focusing on semantics and metaphysics. It will provide a high-level environment for debates whose results will contribute significantly to several ongoing research projects (doctoral theses, papers, and so on), and will open new perspectives. In order to achieve our goals, we will promote the active participation of project members, mostly that of doctoral students and post-doctoral researchers (but also of senior members) to the seminars of both institutions. We will rely on the technical equipment of Universitat de Barcelona and of Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa in order to organize regular on-line meetings, during which the two teams will be able to communicate their results to each other.
A second conference involving the members of the two groups will take place in Barcelona in 2011. The work will appear in a collective volume devoted to varieties of truth and realism.
The project will consolidate an ongoing relation between two groups with similar research interests. It includes, on the Portuguese side, the teams of philosophy of language and of mind of the LanCog (Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa) and, on the Spanish side, the team LOGOS (Grup de Recerca in Logica, Llenguatge i Cognició) of the University of Barcelona. Both groups are very similar in their focus of interest (language, logic, cognition and epistemology, formal ontology and philosophy of science), in their way of operating, and in their international projection. They maintain regular scientific relations, and have organized a series of common activities.
Members of LOGOS including Manuel García-Carpintero, Genoveva Martí, José Martínez, Manuel Pérez, Josep Ll. Prades and Sven Rosenkranz participate in the advisory or editorial boards of Disputatio, a prestigious international philosophy journal edited by LanCog.
João Branquinho, Adriana Silva and Teresa Marques collaborated in the VIII Coloquio Iberoamericano de Filosofía, held in Barcelona in 2003.
Teresa Marques visited LOGOS for two periods of three months in 2006 and in 2007. In the academic year 2007-8, she held a grant for “Stays of Young Foreign Researchers” of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation to do research at the Universitat de Barcelona. Teresa Marques has been a member of the Logos Group at the University of Barcelona since 2007.
Teresa Marques participated at BW5, the Fifth Barcelona Workshop in Issues in the Theory of Reference, held in Barcelona in 2007, with the presentation “Embedding Emotions”.
Adriana Silva Graça participated at the LOGOS Workshop with Saul Kripke Meaning and Use in December 2005, with the presentation “The Semantic Relevance of Speaker’s Linguistic Intuicions”.
Manuel García-Carpintero was in the committees for the Master Theses of Célia Teixeira and Gonçalo Santos, members of LanCog. Gonçalo Santos later became a Ph. D. student at LOGOS, under the supervision of José Martínez.
João Branquinho was in the committee for the PhD Thesis of Dan Lopez de Sá, a Logos member and ICREA Junior Researcher at the University of Barcelona.
Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, José Martínez, Dan Zeman, Max Kölbel, Manuel Pérez, Chiara Panizza, Sónia Roca, Josep Ll. Prades, Josep Maciá, Oscar Cabaco, and other LOGOS members, participated at the ECAP5, the Fifth European Congress of Analytic Philosophy, organized by Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa (CFUL) (with the local organizing committee including João Branquinho, then president of the European Society for Analytic Philosophy, and Teresa Marques), and Manuel Garcia-Carpintero, Max Kölbel, Dan Zeman, participated at the ENFA3, the Third Meeting of the Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy, also organized by CFUL, (with the local organizing committee including João Branquinho and António Lopes).
